HIPAA and Compliance

Phone Scams Targeting Practices: Vishing Defense

The pretexts phone scammers use on medical front desks, why caller ID proves nothing, a callback rule staff can follow and what to do after a bad call.

AssistCall research teamPublished Reviewed by Faruque Amin, VP of Sales and Marketing9 min read

On this page
  1. What a scam call sounds like at a front desk
  2. The pretexts practices actually get
  3. Caller ID proves nothing
  4. The callback rule
  5. Report and stop: what happens after a suspicious call
  6. Close the reset loophole with your IT provider
  7. Fewer cold conversations, and a record of each one
  8. Your patients get spoofed calls too
  9. Training that sticks
  10. Frequently asked questions
  11. References
HIPAA and Compliance: Phone Scams Targeting Practices: Vishing Defense$1.46B: reported losses to tech support scams in 2024, one of the FBI's two call center fraud categoriesHIPAA AND COMPLIANCEPhone Scams TargetingPractices: Vishing Defense$1.46Breported losses to tech support scams in 2024, oneof the FBI's two call center fraud categoriesAva Medical IntakeInsightsHIPAA and Compliance: Phone Scams Targeting Practices: Vishing Defense$1.46B: reported losses to tech support scams in 2024, one of the FBI's two call center fraud categoriesHIPAA AND COMPLIANCEPhone Scams TargetingPractices: VishingDefense$1.46Breported losses to tech support scamsin 2024, one of the FBI's two callcenter fraud categoriesAva Medical Intake
Figure source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), 2024[1]

Key takeaways

  • Phone scammers who target practices pose as IT support, government offices, payers and vendors; the FBI's call center fraud categories alone drew $1.87 billion in reported losses in 2024[1].
  • Caller ID can be faked, including numbers that really belong to a federal agency[2][3].
  • One rule covers almost every pretext: give nothing on an inbound call, hang up, and call back on a number you already had.
  • HIPAA expects caller verification, workforce training and a documented response to security incidents[4][5].

What a scam call sounds like at a front desk

Most calls that try to talk their way into a practice sound routine. Someone from “IT support” says the EHR is being upgraded and needs the six-digit code that just arrived on your phone. A caller from an inspector general's office, with the agency's real number on the display, wants to confirm a few details. A vendor's “accounts team” has new bank details for next month's invoice. A brisk voice says she is the patient's daughter and needs the appointment time now because her mother is confused. Each one is built to get a front-desk employee to hand over something small.

The money behind these calls is large and growing. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center names two categories of call center fraud, tech support and government impersonation, and in 2024 they drew $1.46 billion and $405.6 million in reported losses[1]. Phone calls were the second most common way people reported being contacted by fraudsters in FTC data for 2024, behind email[6]. Practices are attractive targets because their staff are paid to be helpful on the phone, often to strangers, all day.

Reported losses to the FBI's two call center fraud categoriesLosses reported to the Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2022 to 2024. Tech support losses rose 82% in two years.
Reported losses to the FBI's two call center fraud categoriesColumn chart. Tech support: 2022 $806,551,993, 2023 $924,512,658, 2024 $1,464,755,976; Government impersonation: 2022 $240,553,091, 2023 $394,050,518, 2024 $405,624,084.$0$500M$1B$1.5BTech support · 2022: $806,551,993$806.6MTech support · 2023: $924,512,658$924.5MTech support · 2024: $1,464,755,976$1.5BTech supportGovernment impersonation · 2022: $240,553,091$240.6MGovernment impersonation · 2023: $394,050,518$394.1MGovernment impersonation · 2024: $405,624,084$405.6MGovernment impersonationReported losses to the FBI's two call center fraud categoriesColumn chart. Tech support: 2022 $806,551,993, 2023 $924,512,658, 2024 $1,464,755,976; Government impersonation: 2022 $240,553,091, 2023 $394,050,518, 2024 $405,624,084.$0$500M$1B$1.5BTech support · 2022: $806,551,993Tech support · 2023: $924,512,658Tech support · 2024: $1,464,755,976Tech supportGovernment impersonation · 2022: $240,553,091Government impersonation · 2023: $394,050,518Government impersonation · 2024: $405,624,084Governmentimpersonation
  • 2022
  • 2023
  • 2024

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), 2024[1]

Show the data
Category202220232024
Tech support$806,551,993$924,512,658$1,464,755,976
Government impersonation$240,553,091$394,050,518$405,624,084

The pretexts practices actually get

Scripts change, but the requests do not. Learn the requests and the pretext stops mattering. The most damaging pattern in recent advisories goes after account resets: CISA and the FBI describe a group whose callers pose as IT or help desk staff to get employee credentials, make several calls to learn how password resets work, and then persuade help desk staff to reset a password or move a multi-factor token to a device they control[7].

Common pretexts and what they are really after. The tell is the request, not the story.
Who the caller claims to beWhat they ask forThe tell
IT support, the EHR vendor or the phone companyA one-time code, a password, or to install remote access softwareLegitimate support never needs your code or password
A staff member calling your IT providerA password reset or MFA moved to a new phoneA reset requested on an inbound call with no callback check
A federal office or MedicareTo confirm personal details or a patient's identifiersUrgency plus a caller ID that looks official
A payer or billing companyA patient's member ID, date of birth or full recordAsks you to fill in what they should already have
A vendor's accounts teamNew bank details for upcoming paymentsPayment changes by phone or email, never through the contract contact
A relative or another officeAppointment details, results or a record sent to a new addressRefuses a callback to the number on file

The payment change deserves extra care, because it is usually a phone call paired with an email. Business email compromise drew $2.77 billion in reported losses in 2024[1]. A call that “confirms” an emailed bank change is part of the scam, not a check on it.

Caller ID proves nothing

Staff trust the number on the screen more than the voice. They should not. HHS's Office of Inspector General has confirmed that its own official phone numbers are being spoofed: callers pose as its employees and alter caller ID so the call appears to come from numbers on its public website[2]. Faking caller ID with intent to defraud or wrongly obtain something of value breaks FCC rules[3], which does not stop people who are already committing fraud.

The practical rule follows: caller ID tells you nothing about who is on the line, in either direction. A call that shows your EHR vendor's support number can be fake, and a real vendor can call from a number you have never seen. Blocking tools reduce the noise but do not solve this; the robocall blocking guide covers what they can and cannot do.

Government impersonation losses are still rising. FTC data put them at $789 million in 2024, up $171 million from 2023[6]. HHS-OIG's advice to the public is direct: do not provide or verify personal information on these calls[2].

The callback rule

One rule handles nearly every pretext, and it is simple enough to follow at 8:15 on a Monday with a line at the window: on an inbound call, give out nothing that is not already public, then verify by calling back on a number you already had. Not the number the caller offers. Not the number on the screen.

  1. Give nothing on the inbound call

    No codes, passwords, patient details, payment details or system information. Office hours and the fax number are fine; anything else waits.

  2. Take a name and a reason

    Write down who they say they are, the organization, the request and the time. Ask for a ticket or reference number if they claim one.

  3. End the call politely

    Use the script below. Do not argue, and do not explain your security process.

  4. Call back on a known number

    Use the number on your contract, invoice, vendor portal or the organization's official site, looked up yourself. For staff, use the number in the HR file.

  5. Report it either way

    Tell the practice manager or privacy officer, even if the call turned out to be genuine. Patterns show up only when every call is logged.

Script: “Thanks for calling. Our policy is that we don't give out codes, account details or patient information on calls we receive. I'll call your organization back on the number we have on file. Can I take your name and a reference number?” If they push: “I understand. I'm not able to make an exception. If this is genuine, the callback will sort it out quickly.”

Patient information has a legal floor under the same habit. HIPAA requires a practice to verify the identity and authority of anyone requesting protected health information when it does not already know them[4]. Verifying a caller's identity under HIPAA sets out a standard by caller type; the callback rule extends it to everything else a caller might ask for.

Report and stop: what happens after a suspicious call

The worst outcome is not the scam call. It is the employee who read out a code, realized it ten minutes later and said nothing. HIPAA requires security incident procedures that identify and respond to suspected incidents, limit the harm and document what happened[5], and none of that can start until someone reports. Make reporting safe, fast and expected.

Example: a suspicious IT call, reported and stopped
  • Caller
  • Your team
  • System
  1. 01Caller

    Caller asks for a code

    “IT support” needs the code just texted to the receptionist's phone.

  2. 02Your team

    Staff refuses, ends call

    Script used; caller's name, claim and time written down.

  3. 03Your team

    Reported within minutes

    Manager and IT told; the code prompt means someone has the password.

  4. 04System

    Account secured

    IT resets the password, reviews sign-ins and re-checks MFA devices.

  5. 05Your team

    Logged and shared

    Incident documented; the pretext goes into the next team huddle.

Example sequence. An unexpected code request means a password may already be compromised, so the report matters even when nothing was given out.

If something was given out, speed matters more than blame. A code read out means the account password is probably already known, so IT resets it and checks recent sign-ins. Patient information given to an impostor is an impermissible disclosure, presumed to be a breach unless a risk assessment shows a low probability of compromise[8]; breach notification steps for small practices covers the next moves.

Close the reset loophole with your IT provider

Small practices often outsource IT, which means the help desk that resets passwords is someone else's staff. Ask them, in writing, how they verify a caller who claims to be one of your employees. The CISA advisory is the reason to ask: the attackers it describes went after exactly that step[7].

  • No password reset or MFA change on the strength of an inbound call alone. The help desk calls back on the employee's number from your records, or confirms with the practice manager.
  • MFA changes, such as a new phone, trigger an alert to the practice manager.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA, such as security keys or passkeys, where your systems support it; CISA recommends it because push prompts and SIM swaps are being exploited[7]. The setup side is in passwords and MFA for front desk workstations.
  • A named contact list: which staff may ask for resets, and for whom.
  • No remote access sessions started from an inbound call. Your staff call support, not the other way round.

Fewer cold conversations, and a record of each one

Part of the defense is reducing how often a busy person has to make a judgment call on the spot. An SI Employee answering overflow or after-hours calls has no patient chart to read from and no passwords to give away: it answers office questions from approved information, hands anything patient-specific to the staff line you choose, and transfers only to the numbers you approve. Every call has a recording, a transcript and a summary in the AssistCall account, so a suspicious call can be reviewed afterwards instead of reconstructed from memory, and an owner can listen to a call live (what it does).

The transfer rule is the useful part. A caller cannot talk a fixed transfer list into a new destination. The orthopedic after-hours example sends every transfer to one tested on-call number for that reason: the path is decided in advance, not on the call.

Your patients get spoofed calls too

The same trick works in the other direction. If an agency's real number can be faked[2], so can yours, and a patient who sees the practice's name on the screen will trust the caller who asks to “confirm” a card number or a Medicare number. You cannot stop someone spoofing your number, but you can tell patients what your practice does and does not do by phone, so the scam call sounds wrong to them.

Example notice for the portal, statements and the hold message: “We will never call to ask for a code sent to your phone, your full Medicare or Social Security number, or payment by gift card or wire. If a call from our number asks for any of these, hang up and call us back at the number on our website or your statement.”

Then make sure the desk knows the notice exists, because the first patient who gets such a call will ring the practice to ask whether it was real.

Training that sticks

HIPAA requires a security awareness and training program for the whole workforce, managers included[5]. Annual slides do not change how someone answers the phone. Short, frequent practice does. Phishing training for medical office staff covers email lures; the phone needs its own drills.

  • Ten minutes in a monthly huddle: one real pretext from your call log, the script, and who used it well.
  • Role-play the hard version: the angry caller, the one who knows a patient's name, the one with the right caller ID.
  • Thank every report out loud, including the false alarms.
  • Put the callback script and the manager's number on a card at every phone.
  • Include temps, students and the doctor's family members who answer phones on Saturdays.
  • Review the year's suspicious-call log during the annual security risk assessment.

Frequently asked questions

What is vishing in a healthcare setting?

Voice phishing: a phone call designed to get staff to give up a password, a code, payment details or patient information. CISA describes callers posing as IT or help desk staff to obtain credentials and get passwords or MFA tokens reset[7].

Can we trust a call that shows a government agency's number?

No. HHS-OIG has confirmed its own numbers are spoofed in scam calls[2]. Hang up and call the agency back on a number you look up yourself.

A staff member read out a login code. What now?

Report it at once. IT resets the password, reviews sign-ins and checks MFA devices, and the practice documents the incident, as HIPAA's security incident procedures require[5].

Is giving patient information to an impostor a HIPAA breach?

It is an impermissible disclosure and is presumed to be a breach unless a documented risk assessment shows a low probability that the information was compromised[8]. Verifying callers first is required[4].

Where should we report scam calls?

Losses go to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center[1]. Calls impersonating HHS-OIG can be reported to its hotline or to the FTC[2]. Log every call internally either way.

References

  1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (2024). Internet Crime Report 2024 (opens in a new tab) ↑

  2. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (2025). Fraud Alert: HHS-OIG Telephone Numbers Used in Scam (opens in a new tab) ↑

  3. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (National Archives) (2026). 47 CFR 64.1604: Prohibition on transmission of inaccurate or misleading caller identification information (opens in a new tab) ↑

  4. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (National Archives) (2026). 45 CFR 164.514(h): Verification requirements (opens in a new tab) ↑

  5. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (National Archives) (2026). 45 CFR 164.308: Administrative safeguards (opens in a new tab) ↑

  6. Federal Trade Commission (2025). New FTC Data Show a Big Jump in Reported Losses to Fraud to $12.5 Billion in 2024 (opens in a new tab) ↑

  7. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and FBI (2025). Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-320A: Scattered Spider (opens in a new tab) ↑

  8. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (National Archives) (2026). 45 CFR 164.402: Definitions (breach) (opens in a new tab) ↑

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