Key takeaways
- Phone scammers who target practices pose as IT support, government offices, payers and vendors; the FBI's call center fraud categories alone drew $1.87 billion in reported losses in 2024[1].
- Caller ID can be faked, including numbers that really belong to a federal agency[2][3].
- One rule covers almost every pretext: give nothing on an inbound call, hang up, and call back on a number you already had.
- HIPAA expects caller verification, workforce training and a documented response to security incidents[4][5].
What a scam call sounds like at a front desk
Most calls that try to talk their way into a practice sound routine. Someone from “IT support” says the EHR is being upgraded and needs the six-digit code that just arrived on your phone. A caller from an inspector general's office, with the agency's real number on the display, wants to confirm a few details. A vendor's “accounts team” has new bank details for next month's invoice. A brisk voice says she is the patient's daughter and needs the appointment time now because her mother is confused. Each one is built to get a front-desk employee to hand over something small.
The money behind these calls is large and growing. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center names two categories of call center fraud, tech support and government impersonation, and in 2024 they drew $1.46 billion and $405.6 million in reported losses[1]. Phone calls were the second most common way people reported being contacted by fraudsters in FTC data for 2024, behind email[6]. Practices are attractive targets because their staff are paid to be helpful on the phone, often to strangers, all day.
- 2022
- 2023
- 2024
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), 2024[1]
Show the data
| Category | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tech support | $806,551,993 | $924,512,658 | $1,464,755,976 |
| Government impersonation | $240,553,091 | $394,050,518 | $405,624,084 |
The pretexts practices actually get
Scripts change, but the requests do not. Learn the requests and the pretext stops mattering. The most damaging pattern in recent advisories goes after account resets: CISA and the FBI describe a group whose callers pose as IT or help desk staff to get employee credentials, make several calls to learn how password resets work, and then persuade help desk staff to reset a password or move a multi-factor token to a device they control[7].
| Who the caller claims to be | What they ask for | The tell |
|---|---|---|
| IT support, the EHR vendor or the phone company | A one-time code, a password, or to install remote access software | Legitimate support never needs your code or password |
| A staff member calling your IT provider | A password reset or MFA moved to a new phone | A reset requested on an inbound call with no callback check |
| A federal office or Medicare | To confirm personal details or a patient's identifiers | Urgency plus a caller ID that looks official |
| A payer or billing company | A patient's member ID, date of birth or full record | Asks you to fill in what they should already have |
| A vendor's accounts team | New bank details for upcoming payments | Payment changes by phone or email, never through the contract contact |
| A relative or another office | Appointment details, results or a record sent to a new address | Refuses a callback to the number on file |
The payment change deserves extra care, because it is usually a phone call paired with an email. Business email compromise drew $2.77 billion in reported losses in 2024[1]. A call that “confirms” an emailed bank change is part of the scam, not a check on it.
Caller ID proves nothing
Staff trust the number on the screen more than the voice. They should not. HHS's Office of Inspector General has confirmed that its own official phone numbers are being spoofed: callers pose as its employees and alter caller ID so the call appears to come from numbers on its public website[2]. Faking caller ID with intent to defraud or wrongly obtain something of value breaks FCC rules[3], which does not stop people who are already committing fraud.
The practical rule follows: caller ID tells you nothing about who is on the line, in either direction. A call that shows your EHR vendor's support number can be fake, and a real vendor can call from a number you have never seen. Blocking tools reduce the noise but do not solve this; the robocall blocking guide covers what they can and cannot do.
The callback rule
One rule handles nearly every pretext, and it is simple enough to follow at 8:15 on a Monday with a line at the window: on an inbound call, give out nothing that is not already public, then verify by calling back on a number you already had. Not the number the caller offers. Not the number on the screen.
Give nothing on the inbound call
No codes, passwords, patient details, payment details or system information. Office hours and the fax number are fine; anything else waits.
Take a name and a reason
Write down who they say they are, the organization, the request and the time. Ask for a ticket or reference number if they claim one.
End the call politely
Use the script below. Do not argue, and do not explain your security process.
Call back on a known number
Use the number on your contract, invoice, vendor portal or the organization's official site, looked up yourself. For staff, use the number in the HR file.
Report it either way
Tell the practice manager or privacy officer, even if the call turned out to be genuine. Patterns show up only when every call is logged.
Script: “Thanks for calling. Our policy is that we don't give out codes, account details or patient information on calls we receive. I'll call your organization back on the number we have on file. Can I take your name and a reference number?” If they push: “I understand. I'm not able to make an exception. If this is genuine, the callback will sort it out quickly.”
Patient information has a legal floor under the same habit. HIPAA requires a practice to verify the identity and authority of anyone requesting protected health information when it does not already know them[4]. Verifying a caller's identity under HIPAA sets out a standard by caller type; the callback rule extends it to everything else a caller might ask for.
Report and stop: what happens after a suspicious call
The worst outcome is not the scam call. It is the employee who read out a code, realized it ten minutes later and said nothing. HIPAA requires security incident procedures that identify and respond to suspected incidents, limit the harm and document what happened[5], and none of that can start until someone reports. Make reporting safe, fast and expected.
- Caller
- Your team
- System
01Caller
Caller asks for a code
“IT support” needs the code just texted to the receptionist's phone.
02Your team
Staff refuses, ends call
Script used; caller's name, claim and time written down.
03Your team
Reported within minutes
Manager and IT told; the code prompt means someone has the password.
04System
Account secured
IT resets the password, reviews sign-ins and re-checks MFA devices.
05Your team
Logged and shared
Incident documented; the pretext goes into the next team huddle.
Example sequence. An unexpected code request means a password may already be compromised, so the report matters even when nothing was given out.
If something was given out, speed matters more than blame. A code read out means the account password is probably already known, so IT resets it and checks recent sign-ins. Patient information given to an impostor is an impermissible disclosure, presumed to be a breach unless a risk assessment shows a low probability of compromise[8]; breach notification steps for small practices covers the next moves.
Close the reset loophole with your IT provider
Small practices often outsource IT, which means the help desk that resets passwords is someone else's staff. Ask them, in writing, how they verify a caller who claims to be one of your employees. The CISA advisory is the reason to ask: the attackers it describes went after exactly that step[7].
- No password reset or MFA change on the strength of an inbound call alone. The help desk calls back on the employee's number from your records, or confirms with the practice manager.
- MFA changes, such as a new phone, trigger an alert to the practice manager.
- Phishing-resistant MFA, such as security keys or passkeys, where your systems support it; CISA recommends it because push prompts and SIM swaps are being exploited[7]. The setup side is in passwords and MFA for front desk workstations.
- A named contact list: which staff may ask for resets, and for whom.
- No remote access sessions started from an inbound call. Your staff call support, not the other way round.
Fewer cold conversations, and a record of each one
Part of the defense is reducing how often a busy person has to make a judgment call on the spot. An SI Employee answering overflow or after-hours calls has no patient chart to read from and no passwords to give away: it answers office questions from approved information, hands anything patient-specific to the staff line you choose, and transfers only to the numbers you approve. Every call has a recording, a transcript and a summary in the AssistCall account, so a suspicious call can be reviewed afterwards instead of reconstructed from memory, and an owner can listen to a call live (what it does).
The transfer rule is the useful part. A caller cannot talk a fixed transfer list into a new destination. The orthopedic after-hours example sends every transfer to one tested on-call number for that reason: the path is decided in advance, not on the call.
Your patients get spoofed calls too
The same trick works in the other direction. If an agency's real number can be faked[2], so can yours, and a patient who sees the practice's name on the screen will trust the caller who asks to “confirm” a card number or a Medicare number. You cannot stop someone spoofing your number, but you can tell patients what your practice does and does not do by phone, so the scam call sounds wrong to them.
Example notice for the portal, statements and the hold message: “We will never call to ask for a code sent to your phone, your full Medicare or Social Security number, or payment by gift card or wire. If a call from our number asks for any of these, hang up and call us back at the number on our website or your statement.”
Then make sure the desk knows the notice exists, because the first patient who gets such a call will ring the practice to ask whether it was real.
Training that sticks
HIPAA requires a security awareness and training program for the whole workforce, managers included[5]. Annual slides do not change how someone answers the phone. Short, frequent practice does. Phishing training for medical office staff covers email lures; the phone needs its own drills.
- Ten minutes in a monthly huddle: one real pretext from your call log, the script, and who used it well.
- Role-play the hard version: the angry caller, the one who knows a patient's name, the one with the right caller ID.
- Thank every report out loud, including the false alarms.
- Put the callback script and the manager's number on a card at every phone.
- Include temps, students and the doctor's family members who answer phones on Saturdays.
- Review the year's suspicious-call log during the annual security risk assessment.
Frequently asked questions
What is vishing in a healthcare setting?
Voice phishing: a phone call designed to get staff to give up a password, a code, payment details or patient information. CISA describes callers posing as IT or help desk staff to obtain credentials and get passwords or MFA tokens reset[7].
Can we trust a call that shows a government agency's number?
No. HHS-OIG has confirmed its own numbers are spoofed in scam calls[2]. Hang up and call the agency back on a number you look up yourself.
A staff member read out a login code. What now?
Report it at once. IT resets the password, reviews sign-ins and checks MFA devices, and the practice documents the incident, as HIPAA's security incident procedures require[5].
References
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (2024). Internet Crime Report 2024 (opens in a new tab) ↑
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (2025). Fraud Alert: HHS-OIG Telephone Numbers Used in Scam (opens in a new tab) ↑
Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (National Archives) (2026). 47 CFR 64.1604: Prohibition on transmission of inaccurate or misleading caller identification information (opens in a new tab) ↑
Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (National Archives) (2026). 45 CFR 164.514(h): Verification requirements (opens in a new tab) ↑
Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (National Archives) (2026). 45 CFR 164.308: Administrative safeguards (opens in a new tab) ↑
Federal Trade Commission (2025). New FTC Data Show a Big Jump in Reported Losses to Fraud to $12.5 Billion in 2024 (opens in a new tab) ↑
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and FBI (2025). Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-320A: Scattered Spider (opens in a new tab) ↑
Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (National Archives) (2026). 45 CFR 164.402: Definitions (breach) (opens in a new tab) ↑